Abstract-Decentralized and unstructured networks are be-(players in game theory) to choose one oftwo possible actions: coming more prevalent today (e.g. ad hoc networks). Like every Cooperate or Defect. The general scenario that we want to network, they depend on the cooperation of their users to survive. capture is the following: Good users want to cooperate with is played repeatedly they can gradually detect the Bad ones. In this paper, we use a game theoretic model for the above We will explore strategies that the Good users can follow to situation. We assume there are only two kinds of users, Good (benign) and Bad (malicious). Good users receive a high game detect and Isolate the Bad ones. theoretic payoff when they cooperate with other Good users, but Note that we will not be assuming collusion among the a low payoff when they cooperate with Bad users. We propose Bad users, although this can be an extension of our model. behavior rules (strategies) to achieve equilibria that enable as Also, our model for the Bad users means that they benefit many Good users as possible to cooperate with each other, and from staying hidden and cooperating for as long as possible at the same time minimize the number of Good-Bad cooperations. without getting caught. So, we do not cover situations where a single cooperation between a Bad and a Good user is enough,
I. INTRODUCTION
e.g., to destroy the whole network. In ad-hoc networks all nodes are equivalent, in the sense The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the that they play the role of both user and router: they create next section, we briefly present the work done on enforcing their own data traffic, but they also forward the traffic of cooperation in ad-hoc networks. In section III, we give a other nodes. However, for the network to operate successfully detailed presentation of our model of the network and the (i.e. to deliver the traffic to its intended destination) the nodes specifics of the game played. After that, we analyze in section need to cooperate. Seen from a selfish viewpoint, a node has IV the strategies and corresponding outcomes that can appear no a priori incentive to cooperate. Actually, in a resource in the game. Section V shows some indicative simulations and constrained network, as ad-hoc networks are envisioned to be, compares to the analytical approach of section IV, and section a node may have a serious counter incentive to cooperate. That VII concludes. is, by dropping other users' traffic, a node saves a considerable amount of energy.
II. RELATED WORK
This is the model that most of the literature has focused on, and many methods for providing incentives -or in any way A growing body of literature, a comprehensive overview of enforcing cooperation -have been proposed. However, some which is in [1] , deals with circumstances under which the cousers may actually be malicious. They are not interested in operation between nodes can be sustained. A model used often preserving their own resources. They are merely interested in in this literature (but also more generally in power control in destroying the operation of the network, by whatever means ad hoc networks [2] ) is a game theoretical representation of possible. They may be eavesdroppers who monitor traffic and the users in the network (an exception is [3] ). The players in try to learn private information, or they may want to inject game theory attempt to maximize an objective function which malformed packets in the network (worms, etc.) . In this case, takes the form of a payoff. Users make choices and each user's a different approach is called for, since there is no incentive payoff depends not only on his own choice, but also on those that would entice them to cooperate.
of the other users. Hence, in the wireless network context, In this work, we are proposing a simple model for the a user's payoff depends not only on whether he decides to interaction of Good (benign) and Bad (malicious) users in a cooperate (by transmitting other users' data) or not, but also network. Our model is based on game theory, and allows users on whether his neighbors will decide to cooperate. other Good nodes and not with Bad ones. A Good user who Let CNit (resp. DNit) be the subset of i's neighbors that play played D receives a zero payoff regardless of the actions of the C (resp. D) at round t. We assume that i plays C at round t, neighbors. This means that he risks no losses, but he has no so i's payoff at round t is ICNit if the Bad user played D, gain, he learns nothing about his neighbors, and his neighbors or ICNit I-2 if the Bad user played C (Remember that a C learn nothing about him. The payoff of a Bad user who plays from a Good user gives +1, whereas from a Bad user it gives C is equal to the number of his Good neighbors who played -1.). So, just by looking at his payoff, the central Good user C (remember that a Bad user has only Good neighbors). So, i can deduce whether the Bad user played C or D at round it is the negative of vi. We will look at the simplest possible randomization: each . . . . 1 Good user plays C with probability p independently at each Probability of Cooperation (p) round. We want to compute the probability p that maximizes the central Good user's payoff. Given an infinite sequence of Fig. 2 . Expected number of rounds until detection. round payoffs {vt, t 1, 2,... .}, the game payoff for user i is vi = (1 -) §1 t-1v . The parameter 6, 0 < d < 1, signifies the relative importance of current payoffs compared In this calculation, however, we have neglected the fact that the to later payoffs. In game theoretic literature (e.g. [8] ) it is central Good user also plays C with probability p. When he called discountfactor and is often associated with the patience plays D he will not be able to make any observations about his of a player. For example, if d -> 0, then only a few initial neighboring nodes, so the D-rounds will be wasted as far as round payoffs practically dominate the game payoff. On the detection is concerned. The above calculated to is the number contrary, when d -> 1 all rounds are equivalent. In our case, of observations that are needed to detect the Bad user. A C d could correspond to how long the Good user thinks that the will be played once every 1 rounds, so the correct expected network will keep operating. To be precise, d could be seen time of detection will be as the probability that the network will collapse at time t + 1 1 logp(N + 1)
,given that it has been operating up to and including time t.
to(p) = - (- 
To compute the payoff, we split the network evolution into p p two stages: pre-detection and post-detection of the Bad user. shown in Fig. 2 for N = 5. We can calculate that the expected The Good users start by playing C with probability p, and we number of rounds to detection is minimized for p 1. It is assume that the Bad user always plays C. We will see that then equal to to = e ln(N + 1). the pre-detection period increases. payoff is too small, so the total payoff is close to 0. When It seems there are three distinct types of behavior for p approaches 1, the detection time is again too large (hence different intervals of d (Fig. 3) . When d is small, the payoff the observed drop in post-detection payoff). But now the preincreases monotonically with p (Fig. 4) . This happens because detection payoff is close to its maximum value of N -1, so a small d implies that 6'0 -0, and vi -p(pN -1) the total payoff goes up again and becomes equal to N -1 which increases monotonically with p. So, if the Good user is for p = 1. very impatient, then the post-detection payoff is too heavily When d is medium (Fig. 6) , the maximum payoff is again discounted to make any difference, even if the Bad user is attained for p = 1, as in the small d case. However, unlike detected in the shortest number of rounds (to = e ln(N + 1)). the small d case, the payoff does not increase monotonically All the Good can do in this case is increase the pre-detection with p. There is a local maximum for values of p around 0.5, payoff as much as possible by setting p to 1.
which is caused by the same reasons as in the large d case, When d is large (Fig. 5) , 6'0 is approximately equal to 1, although not as pronounced. The conclusion is that, for a given value of 6, the maximum possible value of the total payoff) regardless of p. A value of payoff is achieved either for a probability of cooperation p 6 close to 1 means that the Good users don't mind waiting; so, equal to 1, or for some value around 0.5. The first case provided that the detection happens in finite time, the payoff happens when the Good users are impatient (small d), and is very close to N. This is reflected in Fig. 5 where the payoff so the post-detection period is too far into the future for is almost constant for a wide range of values of p, and the them to care. Which means that all their gains are going maximum is attained for values of p that are around 0.5 and to come from the pre-detection period, therefore the best definitely away from 1. However, when p is too close to 0 policy for them is to maximize the pre-detection period payoff then the detection time is too large, and the pre-detection p (pN -1) We will see that playing D never increases the Bad user's payoff, and it can even decrease it. Suppose the current hiding the diagram for each value of p that the simulation was done. i.e. smaller than X, the Bad has gained nothing in the current simulation curve is monotonically increasing achieving its period, and because of the discount factor 6 the payoff of a maximum at p 1 (similarly to the computation), and for C has become smaller. So, in effect, the Bad player is facing h 0.97 the maximum is attained long before p 1, after the exact same situation he was facing before, only he is in which the payoff drops, just as the computation predicts. a smaller hiding set, and the benefit of a C is smaller. This VI. EXTENSIONS allows us to conclude that the best thing the Bad can do is play C from the first round until he is detected. Hence, the The case of multiple Bad users in the neighborhood of strategies "always C" for the Bad and "C with probability p" a Good user is not much different in essence (there is still (for the maximizing value of p) for the Good form a Nash the concept of a hiding set), although the calculations grow equilibrium. Noone can do better by unilateral deviation. longer. Even if the Good user does not exactly know how many Bad neighbors he has, he can discover after each round V. SIMULATION FOR THE STAR TOPOLOGY how many Bad users were among the cooperators. Since the Another observation is that we have assumed that the set of cooperators changes in every round, the Good user detection is happening at exactly the expected time. This can utilize the information he gathers after each round to translates to an incorrect computation of the expected payoff eventually pinpoint who the Bad users are. For example, if vi. Using equation (3c) to calculate the payoff (vi(t)) for a time a set of cooperators has just one extra member compared to of detection equal to t, the expected payoff over all possible another set, then the type of that extra member (Good or Bad) times of detection (but for a fixed value of p) is What we have computed, however, is happened in the past rounds).
The 6-discounted payoff function is not the only possible 6E[t] (N -p(pN -1) ) + p(pN -1) (7) choice to calculate the payoff of the repeated game. Two other dt (-pp -1)) + p(pN-1).
(8) popular choices in game theoretic literature (for precise definitions, see [8] ) are the average payoff (limTOO T Et=1 vi)
To estimate how far from the truth we are, we performed and the plain sum of payoffs (limTm , j1 vit). Any one some indicative simulations. Shown in figure 7 are the compar-of the three could be used for our game. We chose the 6-isons of the computations to the simulations for three values discounted because the parameter d can be interpreted as the of d:d 0.2, 0.91, 0.97. These were chosen as representative probability that the network will continue existing for (at values from each one of the three intervals of d where the least) one more round, given that it has existed so far. More behavior of the payoff function changes. Each simulation was precisely, d is the subjective estimate of the Good users for that repeated 100 times and the mean and variance are depicted in probability. More emphasis is given to upcoming gains than longer term ones. The average payoff can be approximated
